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Adaptive FTC based on Control Allocation and
Fault Accommodation for Satellite Reaction Wheels
P. Baldi1, M. Blanke2, P. Castaldi1, N. Mimmo1, and S. Simani3
Abstract— This paper proposes an active fault tolerant
control scheme to cope with faults or failures affecting the
flywheel spin rate sensors or satellite reaction wheel motors.
The active fault tolerant control system consists of a fault
detection and diagnosis module along with a control allocation
and fault accommodation module directly exploiting the on-line
fault estimates. The use of the nonlinear geometric approach
and radial basis function neural networks allows to obtain a
precise fault isolation, independently from the knowledge of
aerodynamic disturbance parameters, and to design generalised
estimation filters, which do not need a priori information
about the internal model of the signal to be estimated. The
adaptive control allocation and sensor fault accommodation
can handle both temporal faults and failures. Simulation results
illustrate the convincing fault correction and attitude control
performances of the proposed system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing operational requirements for on-board au-
tonomy in satellite control systems require structural methods
that support the design of complete and reliable Fault Detec-
tion and Diagnosis (FDD) and Fault Tolerant Control (FTC)
systems. Significant research in FDD and FTC has been done
in last decades [1], [2], [3] and many model-based methods
have been proposed [4], [5]. Several fault tolerant control
methods and strategies have been proposed by university and
industry for aerospace applications [6], [7], [8], [9], [10].
This paper uses a detailed nonlinear satellite model to design
an Active Fault Tolerant Control System (AFTCS) to cope
with faults or failures affecting the reaction wheels and
flywheel spin rate sensors. The procedure for actuator and
sensor fault modelling presented in [11] is exploited to define
a nonlinear model affine in all the actuator and sensor fault
inputs and suitable for use of the NonLinear Geometric Ap-
proach (NLGA) presented in [12]. The scalar residual filters
composing the model-based FDD system are designed via
the NLGA to achieve fault decoupling and obtain diagnostic
signals that are independent of aerodynamic disturbance
parameters, and are without detection and isolation errors due
to parameter uncertainties. The fault detection and isolation
is achieved through a residual cross-check and a proper
decision logic, assuming a single fault occurring at any time.
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The adaptive filters of the model-based Fault Estimation
(FE) module are designed via Radial Basis Function Neural
Networks (RBF NN)s [13], [14] which are enabled once
a fault has been detected and isolated. The use of RBF
NNs allows to design generalised fault estimation filters
without a priori information about the type of fault and able
to accurately estimate a generic fault without needing to
define a specific fault internal model. The suggested FDD
system is a substantial improvement of the ones presented
in [14], [15] by the same authors. The fault sensitivity of the
diagnostic filters does not depend on the satellite attitude and
the number of residuals used to detect and isolate actuator
and flywheel sensor faults has been reduced in comparison
to [14]. Moreover, a more realistic actuator fault description
has been considered in this paper, by modelling them as loss-
of-efficiency faults and designing proper estimation filters.
The design of the AFTCS represents a further develop-
ment of the previous works [14], [15], which concern the
fault diagnosis. The AFTCS exploits active and adaptive
reconfiguration schemes of the control actions and sensor
measurements, directly making use of on-line estimates of
the fault signals. Attitude control performances are main-
tained by exploiting redundant actuators through a Control
Allocation (CA) scheme [16], [17]. Sensor signal availability
is maintained by a direct sensor Fault Accommodation (FA)
scheme [18]. This allows to achieve highly accurate perfor-
mances for attitude control and sensor measurement. The
control effort is redistributed to fault-free actuators through
a reconfiguration block in the closed loop feedback system
forming a fault hiding approach [19], [2]. In this way, it is
possible to keep the nominal controller in the reconfigured
closed-loop system, whilst the closed-loop response of the
satellite remains the same, without needing to redesign the
entire controller to counter each fault or failure scenario.
The system performances have been evaluated through ap-
plication to a detailed nonlinear satellite simulator that in-
cludes exogenous aerodynamic and gravitational disturbance
torques in addition to the nonlinear dynamics [20]. As the
gravitational disturbances are almost perfectly known, the
FDD robustness is achieved through an explicit disturbance
decoupling based on the NLGA, applied to the aerodynamic
force term, which represents the main source of uncertainty.
Simulation results are shown for cases of both faults and
failures affecting the reaction wheel control torques and the
flywheel spin rate measurements. Finally, the ability of the
scheme is assessed, regarding dealing with faults of different
types, providing precise detection, isolation and estimates of
faults and maintaining attitude control performance.
II. SPACECRAFT AND ACTUATOR MODELS
The satellite is considered a rigid body, whose attitude is
represented by using quaternion notation.The dynamic and
kinematic equations of the satellite model are
ω˙ =−I−1s S(ω)(Isω+Brwhrw)+ I−1s (BrwM+Mgg +Maero)
(1)
q˙ =
1
2
Ωq (2)
with the skew-symmetric matrices
S(ω)=
 0 −ω3 ω2ω3 0 −ω1
−ω2 ω1 0
 ,Ω(ω)=
 0 ω3 −ω2 ω1−ω3 0 ω1 ω2ω2 −ω1 0 ω3
−ω1 −ω2 −ω3 0

(3)
where ω = [ω1,ω2,ω3]T is the vector of the roll, pitch
and yaw body rates, q = [q1,q2,q3,q4]T is the quaternion
vector and hrw =
[
hrw1 ,hrw2 ,hrw3 ,hrw4
]T is the vector of the
flywheel angular momenta [20]. The principal inertia body-
fixed frame is considered, with Ixx, Iyy, and Izz on the main
diagonal of the satellite inertia matrix Is.
Equation (1) explicitly includes the models of the gravita-
tional and aerodynamic disturbance torques Mgg and Maero:
Mgg =
3µ
R3
(vˆnadir× Isvˆnadir) (4)
Maero =
1
2
ρ SpV 2CD(vˆV × rcp) (5)
where the parameters µ and R represent the gravitational
constant and the orbit radius respectively, vˆnadir is the unit
vector towards nadir expressed in satellite-body coordinates,
ρ is the atmospheric density, V is the relative velocity of the
satellite, Sp is the reference area affected by the aerodynamic
flux, and CD is the drag coefficient. rcp =
[
rxcp ,rycp ,rzcp
]T is
the vector joining the centre of mass and the aerodynamic
centre of pressure and vˆV is the unit velocity vector expressed
in satellite-body coordinates. It is worth noting that, mainly
due to the presence of the unknown terms ρ and CD in
(5), the input Maero in (1) represents the main source
of uncertainty. These torques typically represent the most
important external disturbances affecting Low Earth Orbit
(LEO) satellites [20]. The design of the FDD system exploits
an explicit decoupling only of the aerodynamic torque since
the gravitational disturbance has a model which is almost
perfectly known, and thus it does not need to be decoupled.
The Attitude Control System (ACS) consists of a fixed array
of four reaction wheels in a tetrahedral configuration defined
by the direction vector matrix Brw:
Brw =
 1/
√
3 1/
√
3 −1/√3 −1/√3√
2/3 −√2/3 0 0
0 0 −√2/3 √2/3
 (6)
The elements of the input vector M = [M1,M2,M3,M4]T
correspond to the reaction wheel attitude control torques.
The dynamic equations of the reaction wheel models are
ω˙rw = Jrw−1h˙rw =−Jrw−1(M+b ωrw+ c sgn(ωrw)) (7)
where Jrw denotes flywheel inertia, hrw = Jrwωrw
the vector of flywheel angular momenta, ωrw =[
ωrw1 , ωrw2 , ωrw3 , ωrw4
]T the vector of the flywheel
spin rates, and b, c are the viscous and Coulomb friction
coefficients, respectively [21].
The overall system model is given by (1), (2) and (7).
Thus, the overall state vector can be represented by
x =
[
ω1, ω2, ω3, q1, q2, q3, q4, ωrw1 , ωrw2 , ωrw3 , ωrw4
]T
where the satellite body rates and quaternion are the
controlled states and all the states are assumed measurable.
III. FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION SYSTEM
A. Actuator and Sensor Fault Modelling
The occurrence of faults or failures affecting the actuator
motors and the flywheel spin rate sensors is considered in
this paper. It is assumed that at most one fault can affect the
system at any time.
Since (1) and (7) are affine in the control inputs, the i-th
physical actuator fault can be modelled by the following fault
input where Mci is the commanded control input:
FMi = fMi = Mci −Mi (i = 1, ...,4) (8)
Differently from [14], [15], a more realistic actuator fault
description has been considered and the actuator motor faults
have been actually modelled as Loss-of-Efficiency (LoE)
faults with the scalar LoE factor 0≤ k fi ≤= 1:
FMi = fMi = k fiMci (i = 1, ...,4) (9)
If k fi = 0 the i-th actuator is working perfectly whereas if
k fi > 0, a fault is present, and if k fi = 1, the actuator has
failed completely (i.e. actuator failure). Hence, it results:
Mi = Mci −FMi = (1− k fi)Mci = wrwiMci (10)
where the term wrwi = 1−k fi represents the actual efficiency
of the i-th reaction wheel. The LoE factor and effective-
ness level of the four reaction wheels can be arranged
into diagonal matrices K f = diag(k f1 , ...,k f4) and Wrw =
diag(wrw1 , ...,wrw4), respectively.
On the other hand, the most natural way to take the occur-
rence of flywheel spin rate sensor faults into account, would
be defining the measurement faults
Fωrw j = ωrw j −ωrwy, j ( j = 1, ...,4) (11)
as the differences between the real value ωrw j and measured
value ωrwy, j of the j-th flywheel spin rate. However, this
modelling would lead to the appearance of fault terms in
the output equations, or more in general even to models
nonlinear in the sensor fault inputs.
A different modelling procedure for sensor faults was pro-
posed in [11] and hereby applied to obtain a dynamic model
exploitable for the FDD design with a structure affine in all
the fault inputs as considered by the NLGA. Essentially, it
consists in introducing a suitable set of ν ≥ 1 mathematical
fault inputs fk (k = 1, ...,ν) in place of each physical sensor
fault F , including also a fault input associated to the time
derivative of the fault F . Whenever a physical sensor fault
F 6= 0 occurs, all the associated mathematical fault inputs fk
will become generically nonzero, although with completely
different time behaviors and, in general, without a direct
physical interpretation. Hence, it will be sufficient to recog-
nise the occurrence of any (one or more) of the associated
mathematical fault inputs. For a comprehensive description
of this fault modelling procedure, refer to [11].
Applying this procedure to (1), (2) and (7), a generic j-th
physical flywheel spin rate sensor fault Fωrw j ( j = 1, ...,4)
can be associated to νk = 5 mathematical fault inputs fωrw j,k
(k = 1, ...,νk) and corresponding vector fields `ωrw j,k (x).
Therefore, if (1), (2) and (7) are rewritten by considering the
sensor outputs ωrwy, j = ωrw j −Fωrw j (i.e. y = x+Fx) as new
state variables for the system dynamics, the general structure
of a nonlinear system for the NLGA, which is affine in both
the disturbance (i.e. the uncertain aerodynamic force term
d = Faero), actuator and sensor fault inputs, is recovered:
y˙ = n(y)+ p(y)daero+
4
∑
i=1
gi(y)Mci+
+
4
∑
i=1
`Mi(y) fMi +
4
∑
j=1
νk
∑
k=1
`ωrw j,k (y) fωrw j,k
(12)
B. Nonlinear Geometric Approach
The NLGA was formally developed by [12], and it relies
on a coordinate change in the state and output spaces provid-
ing an observable subsystem which, if it exists, is affected
by the fault, but unaffected by disturbances and the other
faults to be decoupled. In the new (local) coordinates, the
system can be decomposed into three subsystems x¯1, x¯2 and
x¯3, where x¯1 is the measured part of the state affected only by
the fault term f to be detected, whilst x¯2 and x¯3 represent the
measured and not measured part of the state affected by all
the faults and disturbances, respectively. For a comprehensive
description of the NLGA, refer to [12], [14], [15]. Denoting
x¯2 with y¯2 and considering it as an independent input, the
x¯1-subsystem can be defined as follows:{
˙¯x1 = n1(x¯1, y¯2)+g1(x¯1, y¯2)uc+ `1(x¯1, y¯2, x¯3) f
y¯1 = h(x¯1)
(13)
with `1(x¯1, y¯2, x¯3) 6= 0. Starting from (13), a generic residual
generator in filter form is modelled as follows:{
ξ˙ = n1(y¯1, y¯2)+g1(y¯1, y¯2)uc+L(y¯1−ξ )
ε = y¯1−ξ (14)
where L> 0 is the gain of the asymptotically stable residual
filter and ε is the generated diagnostic signal.
C. Design of the Fault Detection and Isolation Module
Since the flywheel spin rate measurements are assumed
to be available, it is straightforward to design four simple
scalar NLGA residual filters independent of the aerodynamic
disturbance and satellite attitude and exploiting information
provided only by the reaction wheel sensors, directly on the
basis of (7). Each of these NLGA residual filters results
to be sensitive only to the couple of faults fMi = FMi ,
fωrw j,1 = Fωrw j (i = j), i.e. the actuator and flywheel spin
rate sensor faults related to the same i-th reaction wheel,
respectively, and the fault input fωrw j,5 = F˙ωrw j , i.e. the time
derivative of the physical sensor fault. These four filters allow
the isolation of the reaction wheel subsystem affected by
a possible actuator or flywheel spin rate sensor fault, but
not the exact and complete fault isolation. An additional
NLGA residual filter is designed to allow the classification
of a detected fault. On the basis of (1) and (7), the fifth
filter is decoupled from the aerodynamic disturbance, i.e.
not subject to detection errors due to aerodynamic parameter
uncertainties. It exploits all the sensor measurements and it
is insensitive to any possible actuator fault and sensitive to
all the physical flywheel spin rate sensor faults through the
associated mathematical fault inputs. The use of only these
five residual filters characterised by fault sensitivities not
depending on the satellite attitude represents a substantial
improvement of the scheme presented in [14]. The scalar
state variables ξ of the five NLGA residual filters are
ξ1 = Jrwωrw1/b ξ2 = Jrwωrw2/b
ξ3 = Jrwωrw3/b ξ4 = Jrwωrw4/b
ξ5 = rxcp(Ixxω1+B1hrw)+ rycp(Iyyω2+B2hrw)+
+rzcp(Izzω3+B3hrw)
(15)
where B1, B2 and B3 are the rows of the matrix Brw.
D. Residual Cross-check Scheme
Assuming a single fault at any time, possible faults
affecting the actuated torques or the flywheel spin rate
measurements can be detected and isolated by cross-checking
the five residuals ε1, ...,ε5 of the NLGA filters exploiting the
variables (15) described in Section III-C, as follows:
1) Firstly, the first four residuals are analysed, which are
sensitive only to possible actuator and sensor faults
affecting a specific reaction wheel. Thus, the faulty
actuator subsystem can be detected and isolated.
2) Then, the fifth residual, which is sensitive only to sen-
sor faults and insensitive to actuator faults, is checked
to precisely determine which fault has occurred.
Finally, due to the presence of measurement noise, residual
thresholds have to be properly selected to minimise the false
alarm and missed detection probabilities.
IV. FAULT DIAGNOSIS SYSTEM
A. Radial Basis Function Neural Network
For a sufficiently large number N of hidden-layers neurons
and if the system state x takes on values in a compact set
X ⊂R`n , a weight matrix W can be found such that a generic
continuous function f (x) can be approximated by RBFs, with
a guaranteed finite model error e∗ [13], [14], [15]:
f (x) =Wϕ(x)+ e(x) =
N
∑
k=1
wkϕk(x)+ e(x) (16)
where W is an optimal weight matrix, ϕk is k-th RBF and
e(x) is the model approximation error satisfying |e(x)| ≤ e∗.
In this paper, the RBFs are modelled as Gaussian functions:
ϕk(xˆ) = exp(−|xˆ−µk|2
/
σ2k ) (17)
where the k-th RBF has center µk and width σk.
B. Estimation of Actuator and Sensor Faults
Considering the occurrence of decreases in the actuator
efficiency levels, the model (14) of each of the first four
NLGA residual filters illustrated in Section III-C is modified.
The purpose is to design four independent scalar RBF NN
adaptive filters for the direct estimation of the LoE factor k fi
of the actuator fault FMi . This is done as follows:{
ξ˙ = n1(y¯1, y¯2)+g1(y¯1, y¯2)Mc+ `1(y¯1, y¯2) f +L(y¯1−ξ )
ε = y¯1−ξ
(18)
where fˆ = FˆMi = kˆ fiMci and the LoE factor k fi of the fault
function f = FMi (i = 1, ...,4) is estimated by the following
RBF NN and adaptive law for the weight matrix Wˆ :
kˆ fi = Wˆϕ(Mc)
˙ˆW = sgn(Mc)ηDεϕT (Mc) (19)
where η > 0 is the learning ratio and D is a proper constant
matrix such that (18) is asymptotically stable. Considering
the occurrence of flywheel spin rate sensor faults or failures,
the model (14) of each of the first four NLGA residual
filters illustrated in Section III-C is modified in the same
way as (18), where the combined mathematical sensor fault
function f = bFωrw j /Jrw+ F˙ωrw j ( j = 1, ...,4) is estimated by
the following RBF NN and weight matrix adaptive law:
fˆ = Wˆϕ(ξ ) ˙ˆW = ηDεϕT (ξ ) (20)
Then, the combined fault estimate fˆ = bFˆωrw j /Jrw+
ˆ˙Fωrw j is
filtered by means of a first order filter with transfer function
1/(s+ b/Jrw) to derive the estimate of the actual physical
sensor fault Fωrw j . These RBF adaptive filters represent an
improvement of those presented in [14], [15].
V. ACTIVE FAULT-TOLERANT CONTROL SYSTEM
A. Design of the Control Allocation Module
The virtual control input vector ν can be defined as the
total control effort of the actuators with respect to the satellite
body axes:
ν = Brwu = BrwM (21)
A standard LQG Proportional-Integral (PI) feedback con-
troller has been designed on the basis of the linearised
satellite model to provide the nominal virtual control input
vector νc required to perform the desired attitude manoeuvre
in the fault-free condition. Direct manipulation of (21) gives
M = Brw†ν (22)
where Brw† is the right pseudo-inverse of Brw, so that
BrwBrw† = I3. The choice of Brw† is not unique. One choice
is obtained from the following minimisation problem [16]:
min
M
(MTWrw−1M) sub ject to BrwM = ν (23)
where Wrw is a symmetric positive definite diagonal weight-
ing matrix which models the efficiency levels of the actuators
and minimises at each time instant the weighted sum of
squares cost associated with the control vector M. The
optimal solution to (23) is M = Brw†ν where
Brw† = WrwBrwT (BrwWrwBrwT )−1 (24)
In the nominal fault-free condition Wrw is set to the identity,
which gives the classical Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse.
On the other hand, once the occurrence of an actuator
loss-of-efficiency has been correctly isolated and estimated
by the FDD system, the AFTCS properly reallocates the
control effort on the redundant fault-free actuators by adap-
tively computing at each time instant the matrix Wˆrw =
diag(wˆrw1 , ..., wˆrw4) = I4 − diag(kˆ f1 , ..., kˆ f4) such that the
associated control component Mci is properly weighted to
minimise the use of the faulty actuator. The control signals
from the desired nominal virtual control input vector νc are
redistributed to the fault-free actuators without needing to
redesign the nominal controller (i.e. implementing a fault
hiding approach) [19], [2], [16]. In the event of total failure
of the i-th reaction wheel, Mci (i= 1, ...,4) is totally rerouted
to the other reaction wheels assuming a sufficient actuator
redundancy. Hence, the satellite is able to achieve the desired
pointing condition, while reducing the performance degrada-
tion due to the fault situation and avoiding mission abortion.
Thanks to the assumed configuration and redundancy of
the actuators, different solutions for control reallocation are
possible to compensate the occurrence of single actuator
faults, achieve the required total control effort and obtain the
desired attitude control performances. Using (22) and (24),
the allocated control inputs commanded to each actuator are
Mc = WrwBrwT (BrwWrw2BrwT )−1νc (25)
and, due to the occurred decrease in actuator efficiency, the
actual control torques provided by the actuator motors are
M = WrwMc (26)
with the resulting total control effort defined as
ν = BrwM (27)
B. Design of the Sensor Fault Accommodation Module
Once the detection and isolation of the occurred flywheel
spin rate sensor fault or failure Fωrw j has been achieved, the
obtained estimate Fˆωrw j is directly injected into the feedback
control loop to compensate the effect of the sensor fault or
failure [18]. Starting from (11), the accommodated sensor
measurements ωrwacc, j (j=1,...,4) are given by
ωrwacc, j = ωrwy, j + Fˆωrw j = ωrw j −Fωrw j + Fˆωrw j (28)
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
It is supposed that rcp = [0.10, 0.15,−0.35]m, CD = 2.2,
Ixx = 330kg ·m2, Iyy = 280kg ·m2, Izz = 60kg ·m2, Jrw =
0.05kg ·m2 and ωrw j(t = 0) = −300rpm. A circular equa-
torial low Earth orbit at an altitude of 350km with R =
6728.140km, ρ = ρmax = 6 ·10−11 kg/m3, V = 8187.63m/s
and µ = 39.86004418 ·1013 m3/s2 is considered.
Sensor noises are modelled by Gaussian processes with zero
mean and standard deviations equal to 3arcsec, 3arcsec/s
and 1rpm for the attitude expressed in Euler angles, satellite
angular velocity and flywheel spin rates, respectively.
An attitude change manoeuvre is considered, commencing at
tman = 5s from the initial attitude expressed in Euler angles
equal to [φ0, θ0, ψ0, ]T = [−15, 35, 25]T deg to the final one
[φ , θ , ψ, ]T = [−10, 30, 25]T deg.
Assuming a single fault at any time, three additive fault
scenarios commencing at t f ault = 10s are considered:
1) complete actuator failure: FM2 = k f2 Mc2 with k f2 = 1;
2) actuator loss-of-efficiency fault: FM2 = k f2 Mc2 with
k f2 = 0.3+0.05sin(2pit/60);
3) flywheel spin rate sensor fault: Fωrw2 = aωrw ωrw2 +bωrw
with aωrw = 0.05, bωrw passing from zero at t = 10s to
−0.5235rad/s =−100rpm at t = 20s.
Figs. 1 and 2 show the diagnostic signals of the second
and fifth residual filters described in Section III-C in the
first and third fault scenarios, respectively. In the second
fault scenario, a result similar to Fig. 1 is obtained. In
particular, the residual ε2 is sensitive to the couple of faults
FM2 , Fωrw2 , whilst the residual ε5 is sensitive only to Fωrw2
and decoupled from the aerodynamic disturbance. Due to
the lack of space, the remaining three residuals, which do
not exceed the selected thresholds, are not shown. Since
each of the four residuals εi (i = 1, ...,4) is sensitive only
to the actuator and sensor faults on a specific reaction wheel
subsystem, it is possible to detect and isolate the faulty
reaction wheel subsystem as described in Section III-D.
Then, a check on the residual ε5 allows to precisely isolate
also the type of the occurred fault since this residual is
sensitive only to sensor faults and insensitive to actuator
faults. As shown, ε5 exceeds its thresholds only after the
occurrence of a sensor fault. Moreover, both the residuals
return to their initial conditions within the thresholds once
the failed actuator has been excluded and the corresponding
control input completely rerouted to the remaining working
actuators, or the sensor fault has been accommodated.
Once the occurred fault or failure has been detected and iso-
lated, the corresponding RBF NN adaptive estimation filter
is activated. Fig. 3 shows the obtained accurate estimates of
the actual LoE factors for the actuator failure and fault, and
of the flywheel spin rate sensor fault, respectively.
Fig. 4 shows the control inputs commanded to each reaction
wheel with and without control reallocation in case of
actuator failure. The actual control torque provided by the
failed actuator is depicted in red. After the failure, the control
input of the second wheel is completely rerouted to the
other working actuators and the failed actuator is effectively
disabled without needing to redesign the attitude controller.
Fig. 5 shows the total control effort provided by the actuators
with respect to the satellite body axes, in the nominal fault-
free condition and in case of actuator failure with and
without control reallocation. The total control effort required
to perform the desired manouvre is achieved thanks to the
actuator redundancy and an accurate control reallocation.
Fig. 6 shows the behaviours of the roll, pitch and yaw angles
φ , θ , ψ obtained with and without control reallocation after
the actuator failure. The attitude presents a large deviation
from the desired reference values, or even an instability, if
the control reallocation is not present. On the contrary, if the
Fig. 1. Actuator failure: residual sensitive to faults on the second reaction
wheel and residual sensitive only to flywheel spin rate sensor faults.
Fig. 2. Flywheel sensor fault: residual sensitive to faults on the second
reaction wheel and residual sensitive only to flywheel spin rate sensor faults.
Fig. 3. Estimates of the LoE factor k f2 and physical sensor fault Fωrw2 for
the three considered fault scenarios.
control inputs are properly rerouted, the desired attitude can
be accurately reached as in the fault-free case.
Fig. 7 shows the behaviours of the measured ωrw2 , with and
without direct fault accommodation. With the active fault
accommodation, the nominal behaviour of the sensor output
obtainable in the fault-free condition is accurately restored.
Finally, Fig. 8 shows the results of a stability analysis
performed through a series of 10 simulations with different
initial attitude conditions and fault severities, i.e. different
values of the actuator LoE factor k f2 .
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented an active fault tolerant control
scheme for the attitude control system of a low Earth orbit
satellite. Fault diagnosis with robust disturbance decoupling
was achieved using a nonlinear geometric approach. The use
of radial basis function neural networks was further shown to
allow for design of generalised fault estimation filters, able
to estimate a generic fault without needing prior information
about the fault internal model. The control reconfiguration
and sensor fault accommodation exploited directly the on-
line estimates of the different fault signals. The simulation
Fig. 4. Actuator failure: control inputs commanded to each reaction wheel.
Fig. 5. Actuator failure: total control effort w.r.t. the satellite body axes.
Fig. 6. Actuator failure: attitude with and without control reallocation.
Fig. 7. Flywheel spin rate sensor fault: flywheel spin rate sensor output.
Fig. 8. Actuator faults: stability analysis of satellite attitude with control
reallocation for different values of loss-of-efficiency and initial conditions.
results highlighted the efficacy of the proposed scheme
to achieve a precise fault detection and isolation, provide
accurate fault estimates and perform a control reallocation
or sensor fault accommodation to compensate the fault
and failure effects. Further investigations will concern the
analytical demonstration of stability of the proposed system.
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